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INTRODUCTION

During the past two decades,
interest

in

researchers.

moral
One

development

among

psychological

and

increase in
educational

of the most exciting issues that has arisen in the

area of moral development
moral

there has been a great

is that

issues from conventional

of whether

issues.

people can distinguish

That is,

can most

individuals

tell the difference between acts that are wrong because of their intrinsic features and acts that are wrong because of societal rules against
them?
In this study,

102 Catholic university students were administered

a questionnaire listing 16 acts considered to be seriously wrong by the
Catholic Church.

The questionnaire tested whether the students consid-

ered each act to be a moral issue or a nonmoral issue by asking them to
rate the acts on four different scales.
one of Turiel 's
nonmoral issues.

(1983)

Each of the four scales tested

criteria for distinguishing between moral

and

The first scale tested the Seriousness criterion with

a four-point scale from "very seriously wrong" to "not wrong at all";
moral issues should be considered to be more seriously wrong than nonmoral issues.
The second scale tested Intrinsicality; morally wrong acts should
be seen as seriously wrong because they are considered to cause harm or
injustice in themselves, while nonmoral acts should be considered not to
1

2

be wTong.

Or nonmoral

acts should

be seen

as

fairly

wrong,

but

because they are seen to have intrinsically negative consequences.

not
This

was tested by having the subjects choose a justification for why each
act was wrong from a list containing both intrinsic and extrinsic justifications.

The third scale measured Unalterability with a two-point

scale (unalterable or alterable); moral issues should be unalterable and
nonmoral issues should be alterable.
ity with a

two-point scale

The fourth scale tested Universal-

(universal or not universal);

moral rules

should hold for all human beings and nonmoral rules should vary from
culture to culture or from religion to religion.
It was predicted that eight of the acts,

designated as

II

II

wrong ,

would be given more moral ratings on all four of the scales than the
eight acts designated as

11

nonwrong

11
•

It was also hypothesized that, for

the eight sexual acts (both the moral and the conventional ones), women
would give more serious ratings, but would give fewer moral justifications (the Intrinsicality scale).
dieted for the nonsexual acts.

However no sex difference was pre-

It was hoped that this study would show

that the majority of Catholic undergraduates clearly see the distinction
between morality and convention.

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Little research has been conducted in the area of discrimination
between morality and convention because it is such a new field.

Most of

this research, however, suggests that individuals of many different ages
agree that certain acts are morally wrong, certain acts are conventionally wrong and certain acts are not wrong at all.

Moreover, most people

have been shown to use the criteria described by Turiel (1983) to make
these distinctions.
Previous Research
Turiel (1983) and Nucci and Junker (1982) have attempted to demonstrate that, with respect to determining what is morally (universally
and unalterably) right and what is morally wrong, there is virtual unanimity among judges.

They have found that subjects

in their studies

agree on what acts are morally wrong, such as killing, hitting and hurting, and stealing.

On the other hand, disagreements usually arise in

matters of social conventions specific to religious and other cultural
communities.

For instance,

attending Mass and avoiding birth control

are rules specific to Catholics and are understood as being arbitrary
(not applicable to all people at all times) and therefore conventional
even by Catholics themselves.
Elliott

Turiel

(1983)

has

outlined
3

several criteria which

he

4
believes are used by children and adults alike when they are distinguishing between the two domains.
described:
ness.

Here four of these criteria will be

intrinsicality, unalterability, universality , and serious-

Also,

examples will be

given of the studies that demonstrate

that people use these four criteria.

Intrinsicality
The first criterion shown to be used by many subjects to distinguish between morality and convention has been arbitrarily designated
"intrinsicality" in this study, although Turiel has not given it a name.
Individuals often consider moral acts to be wrong because they believe
that they intrinsically (by their very nature) harm another person or
are unfair.

For instance, hitting another person, by its very nature,

causes harm, and taking others' possessions against their will or without their knowledge is intrinsically unfair to them.

On the other hand,

conventional acts are not seen to be wrong because they cause harm or
are unfair.

Most people, when discussing the wrongness of conventions,

merely mention that a rule has been broken, an authority has been disobeyed, or simply that they disapprove.

For instance, children respond

to boys kissing boys simply with loud laughter, signalling their disapproval.

None

of the

common responses

depend on a characteristic of the acts

to conventional
themselves.

acts seems

to

That is, noone men-

tions why a convention breaks a rule, why the authority made the rule,
or why he or she disapproves of the act.

Emotional statements such as

"I disapprove of it because it's disgusting" are sometimes heard,

but

few people can explain why they are disgusted by this act as opposed to

5
some other act. Therefore their disgust may not stem from intrinsic features of the act.
The studies listed below have shown that children's and adults'
responses to events considered morally wrong do indeed focus on features
intrinsic to the acts,

primarily the criteria of harm and unfairness

mentioned earlier, while responses to events considered conventionally
wrong focus on aspects of the social order such as the rules involved
and the disgust incurred in onlookers, not on features intrinsic to the
acts.
That the intrinsicality criterion is used could be said to follow
logically from the fact that children do experience direct and unpleasant

consequences

as

a

result

of

many

moral

instance, they hurt when they are hit by others.
rience

unpleasant

consequences

directly

from

transgressions.

For

But they seldom expeconventional

transgres-

sions; they do not hurt when they or others violate the school uniform
code,

for

ex amp 1 e.

Therefore

it is

quite plausible

that even young

children might infer from their own unpleasant experiences with hitting
(intrinsic features of hitting) that hitting is wrong, and have to be
told by others (an extrinsic feature) that not wearing the school uniform is wrong.
A series of studies has been conducted to determine, by observing
children's responses to transgressions, whether the above hypothesis is
true, that
intrinsic

is, whether children's responses to moral breaches have an
focus

while

their responses

have an extrinsic focus.

to

conventional

transgressions

Nucci and Turiel (1978) seated themselves in

6

the

rear

preschool

of

classrooms

children

and unobtrusively

to moral

and

to

tallied

conventional

school or classroom only) rule-violations.

is

actions

(applicable

to

of
that

although the teachers

But they usually responded to actions that hurt them, that
hypothesized to

violate moral

these moral transgressions did,
tures.

responses

Generally, the children did

not respond at all to breaches of school rules,
usually did.

the

rules.

indeed, focus

Their

responses

to

on their intrinsic fea-

They would hit the hitter back, or point out the intrinsic con-

sequences of the act, either by expressing their negative emotions or by
stating that their friend had been hurt.
Much and Shweder (1978) also recorded the reactions of preschoolers to rule-breaches.

These children did occasionally respond to social

transgressions, such as the presence of boys in a room where girls were
undressing.

But

they merely pointed

rules prohibiting them.
they pointed out

When

out

the transgressions

they responded

to moral

and

the

transgressions

the breaches and their intrinsic consequences,

ignor-

ing the authority's possible censure.
Turiel
playground.

and Nucci

(1982a)

observed

children on

an unsupervised

Whenever the possibility arose that some kind of rule had

been broken, they would call one of the children who had been involved
in the event over to talk with him or her alone.
anyone had

done anything wrong.

If

the child said

asked for a description of the wrong act.
had been wrong.

They first asked if

"yes " , they then

Then they asked why the act

Again, the children responded to the intrinsic features

of the moral breaches.

They usually mentioned the unfairness of the

7

moral breaches or the fact that someone was hurt.

Often they mentioned

that someone other than themselves had been hurt or was the object of an
unfair act; they were not simply thinking of their own well-being.

But

they responded to the conventional breaches only by mentioning the rules
against them, or by saying that they did not know why they were wrong.
Nucci, Turiel and Gawrich (1981), using the same methods as in the
above study, found that elementary school children also tended to judge
moral acts using intrinsic criteria (justice, harm, etc.) and to judge
social acts according to the rules that governed them.

In fact, some

children responded to moral transgressions by requesting that the transgressor consider how it would feel to be the victim of the transgression.
A study was performed by Nucci (1984) where he asked Amish adolescents why they considered various acts to be wrong.

He tape-recorded

the reasons they gave and later classified them according to whether or
not they contained any mention of intrinsically negative consequences to
others.

He found

that the moral breaches,

again,

received justific-

ations mentioning intrinsically negative consequences to others, while
the nonmoral transgressions were given justifications mentioning extrinsic factors such as disapproval by authorities who had created the rule.
In summary, acts which intrinsically harm or cause injustice have
been hypothesized to belong in the moral domain because children and
adolescents

respond to

these

intrinsic harm or injustice.

acts

by mentioning

features

involving

Also, acts which only violate rules set by

parental or school authorities are said to belong in the conventional

8

domain because children, if they respond to these acts at all, respond
only by pointing out extrinsic consequences such as their own or the
authority's disapproval.

Therefore intrinsicality of an act is consid-

ered by Turiel and other researchers to be a criterion for determining
whether it is moral or conventional.

However, this conclusion requires

inferring that because children or adolescents mention intrinsic consequences when saying why moral breaches are wrong they believe that the
intrinsic consequences are what makes the breaches wrong.

Perhaps there

is some other common factor besides intrinsicality that joins the moral
justifications and the nonmoral

justifications together,

for instance,

that the moral justifications were the ones they heard from the religious leaders and the nonmoral justifications were the ones they heard
from their

One

parents or peers.

of the reasons

for

conducting the

present study was to clarify this issue by specifically presenting possible justifications obtained from all three of these sources for the
subjects to choose between, some of which stated intrinsic consequences
and some of which did not.

Unalterability
Most people consider conventional standards to be alterable while
moral

prescriptions

are

viewed

as

unchangeable.

Children

have

been

observed in order to ascertain whether they consider moral or conventiona! rules,

or both,

to be

alterable.

Davidson,

Turiel and

Black

(1983) presented 6-, 8- and 10-year-olds with two stories hypothesized
to depict transgressions which belong in the moral domain because they
are intrinsically harmful

or unfair,

and two

stories hypothesized to

9

depict conventional transgressions because they do not hurt others but
are nevertheless prohibited by authorities.
studied

judged

changes

in

the

rules

Children of all the ages

prohibiting

the

conventional

breaches to be permissible more often than they said that changes in the
rules prohibiting the moral breaches were permissible.
Several researchers have administered brief interviews to school
children immediately after they witnessed various transgressions (Nucci

& Turiel, 1978; Nucci & Nucci, 1982).

The children were asked whether

the act just witnessed was wrong; almost invariably they responded that
it was.

They were then asked if it would still be wrong if there had

not been a rule in their school forbidding the act, that is, if the rule
forbidding the act was alterable.

Over 80% of all the children said

that the moral rules would still be wrong, but that
would not be.

the conventions

That is, they considered the rules forbidding conven-

tional transgressions, such as making too much noise in the classroom,
to be alterable and the rules against moral transgressions, such as hitting classmates, to be unalterable.
Weston and Turiel (1980) studied children's evaluations of school
rules.

Only 7.5% of the children believed it permissible for a school

to allow children to hit other children, yet 67.5% said that it would be
permissible for a school to permit children to remove their clothes on
the playground.
This evidence suggests that rule-alterability, like intrinsicality,

is very likely to be a criterion used by most children to place

acts in the conventional domain. On the same token, rule-unalterability

10
is

usually

a

criterion

for

placing

acts

in

the

moral

domain.

Unfortunately, most of the studies concerning this criterion have used
only children as their subjects.

At this time, there is only one study

(Nucci & Junker, 1982) that shows that adults also use this criterion.
This study will be described in the last section of this chapter.
Universality
Moral transgressions are seen as wrong regardless of the presence
of governing rules while conventional acts are viewed as culturally relative, that is, wrong only if they violate rules of the member's religion or other culture. This is because moral rules are seen to apply to
all human beings, whereas conventions are considered applicable only to
the members of a specific religion or other culture, or to persons who
work under the specific authority who made the convention.
Weston and Turiel (1980) asked a second question of the children,
after requesting evaluations of the alterability of school rules.

They

described an imaginary school where each of the wrong acts they had been
discussing was not forbidden by the teachers and principal.

They asked

if a child in that school would be worthy of reprimand if he or she performed each of the acts.

That is, they tried to discern which rules the

children considered to be universal, applicable in the absence of a prohibition by the authorities, and which rules they considered to be relative,

applicable

only because of

the authority's

ruling.

Only 45%

stated that it would be permissible for a child in a school that did not
forbid the act to hit another child.

But 75% said it would be permissi-

ble for a child in the liberal school to disrobe on the playground.

11

Thus, Weston and Turiel's results demonstrate that even elementary
school children distinguish between rules in the moral domain (covering
intrinsically harmful or unfair acts)

and

rules in the conventional

domain (covering arbitrarily wrong acts) by using the criterion of universality.

If the rule is universally applicable their answers tend to

place it in the moral domain; if it is not universally applicable their
answers usually place it in the conventional domain.

However,

again,

only one study has as yet been performed that tests the use of the Universality criterion by adults. This study will be described in the next
section.
Seriousness
In general, moral transgressions are considered to be more serious
than violations of convention.

Smetana (1981) described several moral-

ly-wrong and conventionally-wrong acts to preschool-age children (verbally and by the use of cartoon pictures).

The children rated the mor-

ally wrong acts as significantly more serious than the nonmoral acts,
and suggested more severe punishments for the moral acts as well.
Nucci (1981) found similar results when he presented three types
of acts to 7- and 20-year-old subjects: moral, conventional, and prudential.

(Acts in the prudential domain are said by subjects to affect

only the actor and to never be wrong at all. An example would be a cook
forgetting to put yeast in the bread.

It would be a mistake, but not a

"wrong" act.) The subjects judged moral transgressions to be more serious rule-violations than either conventional or prudential transgressions.
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Davidson, Turie1, and Black (1983) asked the children they studied
to prescribe punishments for the actors portrayed as having done something wrong.

Children of all the ages studied prescribed significantly

more severe punishments for the actors who broke moral rules than for
the actors who broke conventional rules.
Thus the seriousness of rule-violations has been shown to be used
by children as a criterion to determine how they will react to rules.
But, again, only the study to be described in the following section has
as yet demonstrated the use of this criterion by adults.
Therefore elementary school children have been shown to use all
four of Turiel 1 s criteria for distinguishing between moral and conventional breaches and adolescents have been shown to use the Intrinsicality criterion.

However,

only one

study has

whether these criteria are used by adults;
three of the criteria:

attempted

further,

to determine

it measured only

seriousness, unalterability and universality.

Piaget and Kohlberg:

~

Different View

The findings of Turiel, Nucci, and their colleagues contradict one
of the most

important assumptions on which Kohl berg 1 s Moral Judgment

Inventory (MJI) is based (Colby et al., 1979).

Since the MJI has been

the leading measure of moral development to date,

it is necessary to

briefly cover here Kohl berg 1 s opposing viewpoint.

Piaget 1 s theory of

moral development will be discussed first, since Kohlberg has based much
of his theory on Piaget.
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Implications for Piaget's Theory
Piaget's theory,

developed after watching boys playing games and

debating about their rules, states that children originally believe that
all rules decreed by authorities

(for them,

just about all rules) are

unchangeable, that is fixed and absolute (Piaget, 1965).

But they learn

eventually that rules are determined by mutual consent and are therefore
changeable.

He called the first,

undeveloped,

level the heteronomous

level since these children obeyed almost all rules, whatever their origin, and considered all rules to originate from authorities external to
themselves.

The

second,

developed,

level,

he

called the

autonomous

level because these children had learned that they could set their own
rules.

Thus, these rules had an internal origin.

He called the process

of learning this distinction differentiation.
But the evidence
young as

3 years

old can

unchangeable

rules,

They do not

always

(Weston

& Turiel,

cited earlier indicates that

even children as

already distinguish between changeable

universal

and

view obeying

culturally

authority as

1980; Davidson, Turiel

from the one study of adults (Nucci

&

variable

prohibitions.

the right

Black, 1981).

& Junker,

and

thing to

do

The evidence

1982) also indicates that

almost all adults continue to view some rules as unchangeable and universal while they continue to see other rules as arbitrary, perhaps as
determined by mutual consent, as Piaget speculates, if not by authority.
Turiel (1983) asserts that the source of Piaget's inaccuracy was
that

he

observed only discussions

about moral

rules.

about

game rules,

Violations of game rules,

not

discussions

of course, do not have

14
intrinsically harmful or unjust consequences;

if the conditions under

which the game is played are changed the consequences of various ruleviolations are changed also.

Violations of game rules are not consid-

ered to be as serious as moral rules either; they simply are not in the
moral domain.

Game rules

are

playing the game, that is,

changeable

and relative

made by mutual consent.

to the

group

Therefore,

by the

criteria of the individuals studied by Turiel and his fellow researchers, Piaget was studying only conventional development, not moral development.
Piaget held

that he only needed

to study game rules

to

learn

children's attitudes toward all rules, moral and nonmoral, because children cannot differentiate between different types of rules.

However,

Piaget presented no evidence that children cannot distinguish moral from
conventional rules.

Now Turiel and his cohorts have demonstrated that

Piaget's moral development research was based on a false assumption.
Young children do see rules
that they
(Turiel,
changed

are put into effect
1983,

by

p.

those

148).

But

authorities

"as

external entities

and enforced by persons
they also
and

are

see
not

that

some

binding

in the sense
in authority"
rules

unless

can be

they

are

enforced by authorities, while other rules are unchangeable and universal.

Therefore

Piaget was

incorrect

in

assuming that

because young

children connect rules strongly to authority they consider all rules to
be fixed

and universal.

Only the

rules

involving

intrinsic harm

or

injustice are considered to be fixed and universal by children, and this
opinion is also shared by most adults.

15
1

Implications for Kohlberg s Theory
Kohlberg's theory, although based on Piaget 1 s theory, is not iden1

tical with

Piaget s.

Kohlberg

has subscribed

1

to Piaget s

assumption

that children originally do not distinguish between universal and culturally specific rules

(Kohlberg,

1983), or between the moral and the

nonmoral, and that they learn to distinguish these domains in time.

But

1

he does not hold to Piaget s dichotomy between heteronomy and autonomy.
He sees this development as more of a continuum than did Piaget.

Chil-

dren between approximately 1 and 10 years of age (Colby et al.,

1979)

have a "morality of restraint" which Kohlberg views not only as heteronomous but as external; Level 1 children view morality as restraint or
coercion originating from adults.

People between 10 and 20 or 25

(a

very rough approximation since the rate of moral development varies so
much) are at the "conventional" level, Level 2.

They are said to have a

"morality of obedience"; they obey moral rules and societal laws out of
respect

for

the authorities

and

society

from which

they

originated.

This is not the heteronomy that Piaget saw, since morality and convention

are

either.

still

not

clearly differentiated,

Finally, some

morality"

(Level

3);

but

it

is

not

late adolescents and adults have a
they view morality

as mutually

autonomy

"principled

constructed

and

agreed upon by themselves and others, and are therefore considered to be
autonomous.

Only this group clearly differentiates between morality and

convention.
As seen above,
1

Turiel objects to Kohlberg 1 s

assertion, based on

Piaget s theory, that Level 1 children have an undifferentiated view of
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right and wrong, that is, cannot distinguish morality from convention at
all.

And Turiel

believes

that

adolescence

(Kohlberg' s

conventional

level) does bring with it a concern for obeying conventional rules, but
that this phenomenon
moral reasoning.

is unrelated to the development of adolescents'

Since,

from their earliest, external level, children

distinguish between morality and convention, their later reasoning about
convention must be evidence of development

in an entirely different

domain, the domain that deals with societal coordination and efficiency.
Summary
Kohlberg (1969) believes that all matters of moral right and wrong
are intrinsic, unalterable and universal issues.

And he believes that

there are some nonmoral issues of right and wrong which are alterable
and culturally relative, such as sexual matters.
refer to

these alterable nonmoral

issues

as

However, he does not

matters

of convention;

rather, he states that many of the issues Turiel would call conventional, such as law and property, are universal issues of morality.

Yet

he defines the development of moral reasoning as, partly, a process of
learning to distinguish between morality and convention.

Hence there

may be some confusion when his measure, the Moral Judgement Inventory
(MJI) is used to determine subjects' moral reasoning levels.
The studies cited above

show that both children and university

students, most of whom have not reached the principled level of morality
and many of whom never will reach it, do distinguish morality from convent ion.

They demonstrate that Kohlberg does,

the assumptions on which he has based the MJI.

indeed, need to revise
However, as will be seen
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in the next section, the one study that has dealt with adults to date
(Nucci & Junker,

1982) did not come to a definite conclusion as

whether sexual issues are moral or conventional.

to

Do adults consider all

sexual matters to be conventional issues, or are different sexual rules
placed

in either

domains?

the

moral,

prudential

(nonwrong),

or

conventional

It is important to answer this question because, if there are

issues that cannot be experimentally placed in either the moral or the
conventional domain, Turiel's argument that everyone intuitively knows
what issues belong in each domain is weakened.
Kohlberg has maintained that only persons who have reached the
principled level of moral judgment, a small minority of individuals, can
clearly distinguish between morality and convention.

The studies

Turiel and others give evidence to refute this assumption.
stated an opposing viewpoint also:

of

Turiel has

some issues are moral ones, some are

not, and knowledge of the difference is not a developmental issue.

How-

ever, in the area of sexual rules, he has not determined which issues,
if any, are moral and which, if any, are nonmoral.

This study attempted

to delineate the sexual area in this way, as well as to add to the previous evidence that the moral and the conventional domains are distinct.
It was hoped that Turiel's argument would be bolstered by these results.
The Most Relevant Study
The study most relevant to this research is one that was conducted
by Nucci and Junker (1982).

Fifty high school sophomores who were Cath-

olics were administered a questionnaire in a supervised group setting.
Also, 50 Catholic undergraduates at the University of Illinois at Chi-
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cago were given the same questionnaire in a supervised group setting.
The university subjects were obtained by asking each student who left
the Universit;y of Illinois student union if he or she was
Students

who

said

"yes

11

to

such a

question

in

a

a Catholic.

public

place were

assumed to be good enough Catholics for this study, and were asked to
attend the experimental session. They were paid one dollar if they did
attend the session.
The

questionnaire

administered

to

these

one

hundred

Catholics

briefly described 24 acts,

12 of which were hypothesized to be morally

wrong using

described

the

criteria

above

and

twelve

of

which

were

defined as only wrong within the Catholic Church, that is, conventionally wrong.
each

The subjects first rated the seriousness (Criterion #4) of

transgression

using

a

scale

wrong) to 4(not wrong at all).

that

ranged

from

1 (very

seriously

All the acts are considered to be seri-

ous sins by the Catholic Church, and the first page of the questionnaire
confirmed that

the subjects

were aware

of this

fact.

On

subsequent

pages, a significant number of subjects rated the issues predicted to be
moral ones, such as murder, as more serious than the breaches specific
to Catholics, such as missing Mass on Sunday.
The

questionnaire

then

tested Criterion #2

(Unalterability)

by

asking if each act would be "still wrong'' or "alright" if the pope and
cardinals were to drop the rule or

law forbidding it.

pointed out that Catholic dogma holds that the pope has
authority to
Catholics.

determine at

least some

I t should be

the ultimate

matters of right and wrong for

The overwhelming majority of the subjects indicated that it
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would be wrong for Church authorities to remove the rules governing the
issues

in the moral domain.

But

less than half the subjects believed

that it was wrong to remove the Church laws regarding the conventional
actions.

Nucci

and Junker

(1982)

concluded

from these

results

that

"subjects generate notions of the prescriptivity of moral actions independent of the dictates of religious

authorities"

(p.

13).

In other

words, Catholics decide for themselves which actions are morally wrong
and which are matters of arbitrary Church law, although they accept the
Church's designation of which actions are wrong in one way or another.
The final

segment

of the questionnaire tested

for Criterion #3

(Universality) by asking if each act was "still wrong" or "alright" for
non-Catholics.
gressions.

Almost all the subjects universalized the moral trans-

They viewed moral breaches, such as stealing and killing, as

wrong for non-Catholics as well as for Catholics.

But less than half

the students saw the conventional transgressions as wrong for non-Catholics,

who,

unlike Catholics,

are not

subject to

rules governing

the

acts.
From this study one can conclude that the areas of morality and of
religious

convention are indeed seen as two separate domains

members of a religion with a very strong set of conventions.

even by
However,

Nucci and Junker found one rule, the prohibition of homosexual behavior,
which was placed on the borderline between unalterability and alterability

(Criterion #2 above),

terion #3
between

above).

consenting

That

universality and

is,

the

adult men was

prohibition
rated

cultural relativity
against

homosexual

(Criacts

unalterable and universal

by
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fewer people than was stealing but by more people than was premarital
intercourse.

The question arises as to whether the subjects who consid-

ered homosexual behavior to be unalterably and universally wrong did so
because they considered it to be a moral issue or because they considered it to be a convention the violation of which was extremely abhorrent, possibly because it was a sexual issue. In other words, have these
Catholics stated that homosexuality is morally wrong because they have
rationally inferred that it has intrinsically harmful consequences or do
they simply see it

as breaking conventional rules which they cannot

explain rationally?
To help answer this question, let us consider how Nucci and Junker's subjects responded to the other sexual questions.

"A man and woman

who love each other have sex before they are married" was rated as seriously wrong, unalterable and universal by many fewer subjects than was
the homosexuality question. Obviously premarital sex was not considerred
to be abhorrent, so if homosexuality was considered abhorrent it was not
because it is a sexual issue.
It

is

apparent

that

it cannot

be determined

from this

study

whether homosexuality is a moral or a conventional, a rational or an
emotional, issue for Catholics.

Although Nucci and Junker hypothesized

that it was a conventional one, the possibility remains that this act
was considered to be a morally wrong one by some subjects because of the
perception of intrinsically harmful consequences to others, whether to
the partner or to human life in general. Nucci and Junker also did not
look at the sex differences in their subjects' answers.

It is possible
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that men reacted differently to this question than did women.

Perhaps

if the subjects' sex were ascertained, and if a question about female
homosexuality were added, Catholics' attitudes to homosexuality would be
clarified.
In fact, it is not clear whether or not the premarital sex i tern
was

rated as

alterable and culturally relative by so many subjects

because it was considerea to be a conventional issue or for some other
reason. It could have been rated as it was simply because its wording
suggested that the man and woman were engaged to be married.

Also, as

with the homosexuality question, sex differences may have shown up in
the responses.

Sex of subjects needs to be ascertained, and a

II

•
nonmar1-

tal sex II item, which specifies that the couple does not intend to marry,
needs to be added to the questionnaire.
It is possible that there is one other sexual rule that may be
placed in the moral domain by a majority of Catholic subjects because it
pertains to acts that are seen to have

intrinsically harmful

conse-

quences to others' welfare. In Nucci and Junker's study, the act "A man
and his wife with each other's knowledge and permission each occasionally have sex with some one else",

like homosexuality, was

rated as

unalterable and universal almost as often as most of the more obviously
moral issues such as murder.

But, once again, were "open marriages"

rated this way because of intrinsically harmful consequences (a moral
criterion) or because the subjects considered having an open marriage to
be a particularly disgusting violation of Catholic convention?
there sex differences in the answers?

And were
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In summary, Catholics often rated certain acts as very wrong, but
it is not known whether or not this result was a factor of the subjects'
sex.

It is also not known whether the acts, especially the sexual ones,

were rated wrong for moral (rational) reasons or for conventional (often
emotional) reasons.
The purpose of the present study was to attempt to discern into
which of these two categories Catholic men and women's justifications
for sexual and nonsexual wrongness fall by asking the subjects to choose
from several moral and conventional reasons in order to indicate why
they rated each act as wrong.
determine whether

In other words,

an effort was made to

adults use the Intrinsicality criterion in distin-

guishing between seriously-wrong and fairly-wrong acts; the moral justifications mentioned intrinsically-harmful or unjust consequences of an
act, while the nonmoral reasons did not.

This was an attempt to find

out whether or not nonsexual acts are more often considered to be wrong
for moral reasons, or not to be wrong at all, and sexual acts are more
often considered to be wrong for conventional reasons.

Also, it was an

attempt to determine whether or not some sexual acts would fall, as in
Nucci and Junker 1 s study, in a "grey" area between the nonsexual moral
acts and the nonsexual nonmoral acts.

CHAPTER II

PURPOSES AND METHODS
Purposes of the Study
The first purpose of the present study was to replicate Nucci and
Junker's study by showing once again that certain acts that are wrong
for nonsexual reasons (murder, stealing, breaking a very serious promise, and rape) are seen as seriously wrong (Criterion #4) by a majority
of Catholic university students, and that four nonsexual acts,

(missing

Mass and Communion on Sunday, missing }1ass on Christmas or Easter, and
divorce) are seen as fairly wrong or not wrong at all by most of these
subjects. The hypothesis was added that the seriousness ratings of eight
sexual acts would fall between these two extremes, and that the sexual
acts would fall into not one but two groups with respect to their seriousness ratings, because in Nucci and Junker's study many of the sexual
acts fell into a "grey" area between the moral and the nonmoral acts.
That is, it was predicted that male and female homosexuality, open marriage and nonmarital

intercourse would be considered to be seriously

wrong, though not as seriously wrong as murder, etc., and that kissing,
masturbation, birth control and premarital intercourse would be considered to be more·seriously wrong than missing Mass, etc., though not as
seriously wrong as homosexuality, etc., Appendix A reveals the actual
seriousness ratings given each group of acts.
23

(See Table 1)
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TABLE 1
List of Behaviors As Presented to the Subjects

1.

A healthy person does not attend Mass on Sunday.

2.

A man and woman who do not intend to marry kiss passion-

ately.
3.

A teenager engages in masturbation.

4.

A person goes an entire year without receiving Commun-

ion.
5.

A man rapes a woman.

6.

A married couple use artificial birth control methods

(e.g. the pill, condom).
7.

A person, who is financially secure, steals money from

another person.
8.

After promising to keep what he hears private, a man

tells a woman's most personal secrets to a group of neighbors.
9.

A man and woman who do not intend to marry have sexual

intercourse.
10. Two men, who love each other, engage in homosexual acts.
11. A healthy person does not attend Mass on either Christ-

mas or Easter.
12. A married couple get a divorce.
13. A man and his wife with each other's knowledge and permission each occasionally have sexual intercourse with
someone else.
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14. A man shoots and kills a stranger on a train platform.
15. A man and woman who love each other have sexual intercourse before they are married.
16. Two women, who love each other, engage in homosexual
acts.
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The second purpose of the study was to answer four questions, two
of which were posed in the previous chapter:
Morality vs. Convention
Are the behaviors considered by the subjects to be wrong seen as
wrong because they are viewed as moral issues or as conventional issues?
Thus,

when

Intrinsicality

hypothesized above

(Criterion #1)

to be rated

as

is

tested,

the

very seriously wrong

eight

acts

(designated

"wrong" acts) should be given a higher percentage of moral justifications than the eight acts predicted not to be rated as very seriously
wrong (designated "nonwrong" acts).
seen as moral breaches and the

11

That is, the "wrong" acts should be

nonwrong 11 acts should be seen as either

conventional breaches only or not wrong at all (prudential breaches).
The two prudential justifications listed in the questionnaire indicated
that the act harms only the actor.

Subjects were not expected to use

these, since an act's being only a mistake that harms the actor should
not be enough for it to be cons ide red wrong, and

acts not cons ide red

wrong were, of course, not given reasons why they were wrong.
To elaborate on the findings of Nucci and Junker, it was also predieted that the eight sexual acts, although in a "grey" area between the
two groups of nonsexual acts, would fall into not one but two groups
with respect to their seriousness ratings and the number of moral justifications they received.

That is, the four "wrong" acts that are sex-

ual were expected to be rated as more seriously wrong and to be given
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more moral justifications (as opposed to nonmoral justifications) than
were the four "nonwrong" sexual acts.

This hypothesis originated from

personal observation; many individuals appear to think in terms of two
different groups of sexual acts, those that are wrong and moral issues,
and those that are not wrong and are not moral issues.
Thus, an interaction between sexual vs. nonsexual acts and "wrong"
vs.

"nonwrong" acts was expected, since the sexual acts were predicted

to fall into two groups between the two groups of nonsexual acts.

It

was hypothesized that the highest seriousness ratings and the most moral
justifications would be given for the nonsexual, seriously wrong acts;
the next highest amount of seriousness ratings and percentage of moral
justifications should be given for sexual seriously-wrong acts.

Then

sexual non-seriously-wrong acts should follow, and nonsexual, non-seriously-wrong acts should receive the lowest seriousness ratings and number of moral justifications.

Thus, the nonsexual "wrong" acts should be

most likely to be considered to be moral issues according to both the
Seriousness and Intrinsicality criteria, the sexual "wrong" acts should
be the second most likely to be considered moral, and the sexual "nonwrong" acts should be the third most likely to be considered moral.

The

nonsexual "nonwrong" acts should be the least likely to be considered to
be moral issues.
One of the 16 acts, rape, was quite difficult to place in a group.
Rape is obviously a sexual act, but it is definitely a violent act also.
Thus, there was a question as to whether it should be placed among the
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violent acts

(the nonsexual "wrong" acts) or the serious sexual acts.

The decision was made to place it in the former group because it was
predicted that university students would focus on the violent rather
than on the sexual nature of rape when trying to decide how seriously
wrong it is.

That is, it was predicted that the same seriousness rat-

ings would be given to rape as to the nonsexual "wrong" acts, and lower
seriousness ratings would be given to all the other sexual acts because
none of the other sexual acts necessarily involves violence.
Unalterability
Are the acts considered by the subjects to be the most seriously
wrong rated as alterable or unalterable (Criterion #2)?

It was hypoth-

esized that the acts rated as the most seriously wrong would also be
rated as

unalterable and that the acts rated as the

least seriously

wrong or as not wrong would be rated as alterable.
Univer_~a.lity

Are the acts considered by the subjects to be the most seriously
wrong rated as universally wrong or as culturally relative (Criterion
#3)? It was hypothesized that the acts rated as the most seriously wrong
would also be rated as universally wrong and that the acts rated as the
least seriously wrong would be rated as culturally relative.
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Sex Differences
How do men and women differ

in their

ratings

of seriousness,

alterability and universality of each of the groups of acts?

Are women

more likely than men to see acts, especially sexual acts, as belonging
in the moral domain? It was hypothesized that women would be more likely
than men to rate
because women
strictly.

sexual acts

may have

as serious,

been socialized

unalterable and universal,
to view

sexual

issues

more

But, adding an interaction to the hypothesis, women were also

predicted to be more likely to rate sexual acts as wrong for conventional reasons, again because they were socialized more carefully than
were men concerning sexual right and wrong.

Theorists have tried to

explain this predicted sex difference in socialization in many ways.
Social learning theorists say that girls model their sexual behavior on
that of their mothers, which is more strict than that of their fathers.
Sociobiologists claim that, since women have babies and men do not, it
is only to the women's advantage to restrict themselves to one sexual
partner who can help protect the children.
Specifically,

then, it was predicted that women would give more

"very seriously wrong",

"seriously wrong",

unalterable,

and universal

ratings to the sexual acts than would men, while there would be no sex
difference here

in the nonsexual acts.

But women should give

fewer

moral justifications for the wrongness of the sexual acts than men, even
though they should consider the sexual acts to be more seriously wrong
than men.

(For the nonsexual acts, both the men and the women were pre-
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dieted, as stated above, to give more moral justifications to the acts
they considered to be more serious.)
Methods
Subjects and Materials
One hundred two students consisting of 48 men, 50 women and four
subjects who failed to write their sex volunteered to participate in the
study.

An attempt was made to enlist only students who considered them-

selves to be practicing Catholics.

Most of the subjects were attending

one of Loyola University's general psychology classes.
A cover sheet adapted from that used by Nucci and Junker was used
to ascertain whether all subjects could,
practicing Catholics.

indeed, be considered to be

Fifty-six percent of the subjects stated that

they attend Mass and receive Communion at least every Sunday.

Seventy-

two percent have had at least a few years of education in a Catholic
school as children.

Eighty-eight percent of the subjects stated that

they adhere to the basic Catholic belief,

the virgin birth, while 98

percent adhere to the belief in Christ's resurrection.

However, only 41

percent believe that the pope is infallible when he speaks officially on
matters of faith and morals.
The questionnaire was

also similar to that used by Nucci and

Junker, although it was considerably shorter because only eight of Nucci
and Junker's many nonsexual acts were used.

(See Appendix C.)

In all,

thirteen of the behaviors they listed were selected for use

in this
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study;

an attempt was made to choose an equal number of sexual

and

nonsexual acts and an equal number of acts that would be considered to
be seriously wrong and not wrong.
ied word for word.

Twelve of the 13 behaviors were cop-

One of the behaviors,

"A man and woman have sex

before they are married" was reworded to, "A man and woman have sexual
intercourse before they are married" to prevent misunderstanding.
more acts were added, bringing the total number of acts to 16.

Three

The non-

marital intercourse item needed to clarify the answers to the premarital
intercourse question was one of the three acts.

The female homosexual-

ity item mentioned in Chapter I was another.

And an item describing

"passionate kissing" was added so that the sexual "wrong" group of acts
would contain four items as the other groups do.

The section to deter-

mine whether subjects were aware that the Church forbids all the acts
was deleted, and a list of justifications was added.

The three added

questions were checked with Catholic authorities to make sure that the
Catholic Church considers them to be serious sins.

(Added portions were

written by the author.)
On page 4 of the questionnaire a list of 13 justifications for why
a given act could be wrong was included in order to test the Intrinsicality criterion, as mentioned in Chapter I, Section B.

Seven of the

reasons were moral ones, that is, they mentioned the intrinsic consequences (harm o·r injustice) of the act or the universality and unalterability of its wrongness.

Persons who gave these reasons could be said

to be reasoning from the acts' intrinsic features to the fact that they
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are wrong.
Eight of the justifications were nonmoral;
intrinsic features of the acts.
ventional

reasons,

they did not involve

Of the nonmoral reasons, five were con-

since they stated that

the act violated Catholic

rules or could cause the perpetrator to incur scorn or disgust.

Two

were prudential reasons, mentioning only possible harm to the perpetrator.

Persons who gave these reasons could not be said to be reasoning

to the wrongness of acts; they would be showing concern that authority
would be violated or others would disapprove or, in the case of the prudential acts, that they themselves would suffer.
There were two versions of the justification page, to find out
whether the subjects' responses were affected by the order of the justifications.

The justifications were first listed in random order, and

this format was designated

11

A11 •

Then the order of the justifications

was reversed; this format was designated

11

B11 •

Procedures

Seriousness of act.
small supervised groups.

The questionnaire was administered in many
The first variable, Seriousness, was measured

on pages 2 and 3 of the questionnaire.

(See Appendix C.)

The subjects

were asked to circle one of four numerals to describe each of the 16
acts.

The numeral 1 signified

wrong, 11 3

11

fairly wrong, 11 and 4

11

11

Very seriously wrong, 11 2

not wrong at all. 11

11

seriously
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The data that resulted were tabulated in two different ways.

For

the purpose of performing the analysis relating seriousness to the percentage of moral justifications,
(very

seriously

counted.

wrong)

and

Then all the acts

the acts

given

moral

rated as

that were both rated
justifications

1 were counted.

were

as

1

first

Afterward,

the

number of 1 acts given moral justifications was divided by the total
number of 1 acts, creating a percentage of very serious acts given moral
justifications.

The same process was used to create a percentage of

moral justifications given to the 2 (seriously wrong) acts and to the 3
(fairly wrong) acts.

Data analysis compared these three percentages.

For the purpose of comparing seriousness with nature (sexual vs.
nonsexual) and hypothesized wrongness of acts, the numbers pertaining to
the seriousness ratings circled by each subject for the
ual

acts,

"wrong"

sexual acts,

"nonwrong" sexual

II

wrong

II

nons ex-

acts

and "nonwrong"

nonsexual acts were each totaled, producing four sums.

Data analysis

compared these sums.

Moral vs. nonmoral justifications.
nonmoral (conventional or prudential)

The second variable, moral vs.

justifications for the wrongness

of acts, was measured by having the subjects read a
justifications on page 4 of the questionnaire.

list of possible

Then they returned to

pages 2 and 3 and wrote the letter corresponding the justification they
considered most

appropriate after

each act

they had

rated as

wrong.

Acts not considered to be wrong were, of course, not to be given reasons
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why they were wrong, so the subjects placed an X after each of these
acts.
For the purpose of relating the number of moral justifications
given to the nature and wrongness of the acts, the number of moral justifications given by each subject for why each group of acts (nonsexual
"wrong," sexual "wrong," sexual "nonwrong" and nonsexual "nonwrong") was
wrong was simply counted.
Unalterability.

Data analysis compared the four numbers.

The third variable, unalterability, was measured

on page 5, where the question was posed, "For each act, if the pope and
cardinals agreed to drop the rule or law, would the act be still wrong
or all right?"

Blanks were arrayed in columns under the two phrases

"still wrong" and "all right," and the subjects placed a check on the
blank under the phrase that they believed applied to each act, providing
a 2-point scale.
The set of unalterability data was tabulated in much the same way
that the first set of seriousness data was tabulated.

The acts rated as

unalterable ("still wrong" after being changed by the pope) were first
counted.

Then they were divided by the total number of acts which were

both rated as unalterable and given one or another type of justification.

(It will be remembered that acts rated as not wrong were not

given justifications.)

Next, the acts rated as alterable were counted

and converted to a percentage by also being divided by the total number
of acts given justifications.

The analysis compared the percentage of
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moral

justifications

given

to

acts

rated

as

unalterable

with

the

percentage of moral justifications given to acts rated as alterable.
Universality.

The fourth variable, universality, was measured on

page 6, where the question was posed, "For each act indicate whether it
would be wrong or all right for another religion to have no rule or law
about the act."

As for unalterability, blanks were arrayed in columns

under the two phrases "still wrong" and "all right," and the subjects
placed a check on the blank under the phrase that they believed applied
to each act.
Universality data were obtained in exactly the same way that the
unalterability data were obtained.

Then data analysis compared the per-

centage of moral justifications given to acts rated as universal with
the percentage of moral justifications given to acts rated as culturally
relative.
In conclusion, the data obtained in this study were tabulated in
such a way as to try to answer the question which arose from Nucci and
Junker 1 s research as to which issues Catholics consider to be moral
ones, and which they consider to be conventional and therefore applicable only to Catholics.

It was also hoped that the study would answer

the question as to what the sex differences
views of the various acts are.

in university students 1

CHAPTER III

RESULTS
Morality vs. Convention
Relation of Seriousness, Sex of Subject and Justifications
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (R-ANOVA) was performed,
where the between-subject variable was sex of subject and the withinsubject variable was the seriousness rating given each act by each subject.

The seriousness ratings were coded 1 (very seriously wrong),

(seriously wrong) and 3 (fairly wrong).

2

The dependent variable was the

percentage of moral justifications given for each of these seriousness
ratings.

(The results are shown in Figure 1 and Table 2.)

Moral vs. Nonmoral Acts.

The data confirmed the hypothesis that a

significantly higher percentage of moral justifications would be given
for the acts that were rated as most seriously wrong (the "wrong" acts)
than for the acts rated as least seriously wrong (the "nonwrong" acts),
[.[(2,174)=33.96, £<.0001).

Subsequent

~tests

showed that the differ-

ences in percentage of moral justifications between the three seriousness ratings were all significant (all ES<. 001).

These results show

that the acts seen by the subjects to be the most seriously wrong were
significantly more often seen as wrong for moral reasons than for nonmoral reasons and that the acts seen to be the least seriously wrong were
seen as wrong for nonmoral reasons significantly more often than for
36
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% of Moral
Justifications

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

Very Seriously
Wrong (1)

Figure 1:

Seriously
Wrong (2)

Fairly Seriously
Wrong (3)

Percent of Moral Justifications as a Function of Seriousness
of Act
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TABLE 2
Mean Percent of Moral Justifications by Seriousness of Act and Sex
Male

Female

Marginal

1 Acts

74.2

78.9

76.7

2 Acts

62.1

59.3

60.6

3 Acts

46.0

33.4

39.5

Marginal

60.8

57.2

58.9

39
moral reasons.
were

considered

That is,
to

be

seriously wrong were

the behaviors viewed as most seriously wrong
moral

issues

and

the

acts

considered to be conventional

viewed
issues.

as

least

Also,

as

expected, the prudential justifications were rarely used.

Male vs. Female Subjects.

The hypothesis that the percentage of

moral justifications used by men and by women would differ was not supported by the data

[I(1,87)=0.50, n.s.].

Thus, the men and the women

used equal percentages of moral justifications;

the women did not see

wrong acts as wrong for emotional reasons any more often than did men.
The

expected

sex

by

seriousness

interaction

was

not

obtained

[I(1,174)=1.87, n.s.J.
Relation of Nature, Wrongness, Sex of Subject and Seriousness
A 2 (Nature of Act) X 2 (Wrongness of Act) X 2

(Sex) R-ANOVA was

performed, in which wrongness was nested within nature and wrongness and
nature were
Table 3)

both nested within the

sex variable.

(See Figure

2 and

The nature of an act can be either sexual, such as premarital

intercourse, or nonsexual, such as missing t-1ass on Sunday.

The wrong-

ness variable also contained two levels; it was simply hypothesized that
eight acts, designated "wrong," would be rated more seriously wrong than
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Mean Total
Seriousness

12

10

8

6

4

2

Sexual
Acts
Figure 2:

Nonsexual
Acts

Seriousness Ratings as a Function of Nature and Wrongness of
Act
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TABLE 3
Mean Seriousness Ratings by Nature and Wrongness of Act and Sex

Male

Female

Marginal

6.229

5.200

5.704

Nonsexual Wrong

10.667

10.840

10.755

Sexual Nonwrong

2.146

2.320

2.235

Sexual Wrong

8.208

7.660

7.929

Marginal

6.813

6.505

6.666

Nonsexual Nonwrong
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would

the

other

eight

acts,

II

designated

nonwrong.

II

The

dependent

variable was the sum of the seriousness ratings given to each of the
four groups of acts (formed by combining the two levels of nature with
the two levels

of wrongness).

Thus the

dependent variable contained

four levels. In this analysis, all the seriousness ratings, from 1 (very
serious) to 4 (not wrong at all) were used.

The ratings were treated as

continuous (although they were not necessarily treated as such by the
subjects) for lack of a more reliable way to analyze the data so as to
include the 4 (not wrong at all) ratings.

(This violated the assumption

that the dependent variable was a continuous rating.)

"Wrong" vs. "nonwrong" acts.
"wrong"

acts

received

Supporting the prediction, the eight

significantly higher

total

seriousness

ratings

than did the eight acts hypothesized to be "nonwrong" [.£:(1,96)=910.79,
E<.0001].

This demonstrates that the "wrong" acts are considered to be

significantly more seriously wrong than are the "nonwrong" acts.

This

is evidence that the hypotheses were correct in their predictions of
which acts would be seen as
"nonwrong" by the subjects.

Sexual

vs.

nonsexual

"wrong" and which acts would be seen as
(See Table 4)

acts.

Unexpectedly,

the

nonsexual

acts

received significantly higher seriousness ratings than did the sexual
acts [£(1,96)=253.51, E<.0001].

Thus, in general, the sexual acts were

viewed as significantly less serious by these subjects than were the
nonsexual acts.

(See Table 4)
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TABLE 4
Percentage of Responses Given Using Each Seriousness Rating

Very
Seriously
Wrong (1)

Seriously
Wrong (2)

Fairly
Seriously
Wrong (3)

Not
Wrong
At All

Nonsexual "Wrong" Acts
5. Rape

97.1

2.0

0.0

1.0

7. Stealing

67.6

29.4

2.9

0.0

8. Br. Promise

52.0

35.3

11.8

1.0

14. Murder

97.1

2.0

1.0

0.0

Sexual "Wrong" Acts
9. Nonmar. Int.

17.6

18.6

32.4

31.4

10. Male Homo.

50.0

20.6

19.6

9.8

13. Open Mar.

55.9

29.4

9.8

4.9

16. Fern. Homo

50.0

20.6

19.6

9.8
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TABLE 4 (cont.)

Very
Seriously
Wrong (1)

Seriously
Wrong (2)

Fairly
Seriously
Wrong (3)

Not
Wrong
At All

Nonsexual "Nonwrong" Acts
1. Miss Mass

8.8

21.6

45.1

24.5

4. Miss Comm.

17.6

28.4

33.3

20.6

11. Xmas, Eas.

28.4

26.5

31.4

13.7

12. Divorce

17.6

29.4

27.5

25.5

Sexual "Nonwrong " Acts
2. Kissing

0.0

2.9

10.8

86.3

3. Mastur.

7.8

15.7

28.4

48.0

6. Birth Cont.

3.9

6.9

22.5

66.7

15. Prem. Int.

5.9

13.7

23.5

56.9
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Mal~~~·

female subjects.

The hypothesized effect of sex of sub-

ject was not supported by the data [E(1,96)=0.60,

n.s.], showing that

men and women did not give significantly different seriousness ratings
to the 16 acts.

That is, the male subjects were not significantly more

likely than were the female subjects to see the sexual acts as being
more seriously wrong than the nonsexual acts.

There was also no inter-

action between nature of act and sex of subject [E(1,96)=0.37,
and there was no interaction between wrongness and sex
n.s.].

n.s.],

[E(1,96)=0.45,

(See Appendix A.)

Interaction between wrongness and nature of act.
between

wrongness

and

nature

of

act

merely

The interaction

approached

significance

[E(1,96=2.90, £<.1]. Subsequent within-subject ttests revealed that the
nonsexual "wrong" acts received significantly higher seriousness ratings
than did the sexual "wrong" acts,
seriousness

ratings

than

the

which received significantly higher

nonsexual

"nonwrong"

acts.

The

"nonwrong" acts received the lowest seriousness ratings of all.

sexual
It will

be remembered that an interaction had been predicted, such that the four
groups would array themselves slightly differently:
sexual
results

"wrong,"
show,

sexual

"nonwrong,"

as expected,

then

nonsexual

that the four sexual

nonsexual

II

wrong,

"nonwrong."

II

The

"wrong" acts such as

homosexuality, are considered by university students to be significantly
more seriously wrong than the nonsexual "nonwrong" acts such as divorce
and missing Mass, as well as the sexual "nonwrong" acts such as murder
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and stealing.

That is, there are two distinct types of sexual acts,

seriously-wrong ones

and nonserious ly-wrong or nonwrong ones,

eyes of university students,

in the

just as there are two distinct types of

nonsexual acts.
Overall interaction.

For the dependent variable of seriousness,

there was a significant interaction between nature of act, wrongness of
act and sex of subject [£(1,96)=6.12, £<.05].

In order to discern how

the nature-wrong interaction could have been only marginally significant
while the 3-way interaction was significant, a simple effects analysis
was performed which calculated separate CFC values for the nature-wrongness interaction pertaining to the male subjects and to the female subjects.

It was found that, for the men, there was a significant nature-

wrongness interaction [£(1,96)=8.95, £<.05], but for the women there was
no nature-wrongness interaction [£(1,96)<1.00, n.s.).
Thus, the men's seriousness ratings did not increase from sexual
to nonsexual

"wrong" acts

as much as the women's ratings

increased,

while the men's ratings increased much more than did the women's from
sexual to nonsexual "nonwrong" acts.

This means that

the women saw

approximately equal distinces between the four groups while the men saw
the sexual "wrong," nonsexual "wrong" and nonsexual "nonwrong" acts as
being somewhat closer in seriousness than did the women and the sexual
"nonwrong" acts as being even further below the other acts in seriousness than did the women.
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Continuing the simple effects analysis,

the significance of the

differences between the men and the women in each of the four naturewrongness groups was tested.

On 1y t h e nonsexua 1

II

nonwrong II acts were

seen significantly differently by the two sexes [!(1,384)=3.99, £<.05].
Thus, the men saw divorce and missing Mass and Communion as significantly

more

seriously wrong

than

did

the

The

women.

other

three

nature-wrongness groups were given equivalent seriousness ratings by the
men and by the women [all Es(1,384)<2.00, n.s.].
Relation of Nature, Wrongness, Sex and Justifications
A 2 (Nature of Act) X 2 (Wrongness of Act) X 2 (Sex) R-ANOVA was
performed, in which wrongness was again nested within nature and wrongness and nature were both nested within the sex variable. But here the
dependent variable was the sum of the moral justifications given for why
the acts in each of the four
variable contained four levels.

groups were wrong.

(Thus the dependent

See Figure 3 and Table 5.)

"Wrong" vs._"nonwrong" acts.

Supporting the prediction, the eight

"wrong" acts received significantly more moral justifications than did
the eight acts hypothesized to be "nonwrong" [!(1,88)=182.55, £<.0001].
This demonstrates that the eight "wrong" acts, besides being considered
to be more seriously wrong by the subjects, were also considered significant ly more often to be moral issues than were the eight "nonwrong"
acts.

This is further evidence that acts seen as the most seriously
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% of Moral
Justifications

0.9

0.6

0.3

"Nonwrong" Acts

0.0

Sexual
Acts

Figure 3:

Nonsexual
Acts

Percent of Moral Justifications By Nature and Wrongness of
Act
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TABLE 5
Mean Percent of Moral Justifications by Nature, Wrongness and Sex
Marginal

Nale

Female

Nonsexual Nonwrong

31.0

28.2

29.6

Nonsexual Wrong

87.9

88.1

88.1

Sexual Nonwrong

31.4

24.4

28.1

Sexual Wrong

66.7

55.8

61.4

Marginal

54.2

49.1

51.7
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wrong were the same ones that were seen to be matters of morality, not
of convention, as well as that the hypotheses correctly grouped each of
the 16 acts as

n

wrong u or

tt

nonwrong " .

Sexual vs. nonsexual acts.

As in the previous analysis, an unex-

pected effect of nature of act was found.

The nonsexual acts received

significantly

than

more

moral

[£(1,88)=21.59, £<.0001].

justifications

did

the

sexual

acts

Thus, in general, the sexual acts were viewed

significantly less often by these subjects to be moral issues than were
the nonsexual acts.

However, four of the sexual acts were viewed sig-

nificantly more often than any of the "nonwrong" acts,
sexual "nonwrong" acts,
moral

justifications

to be moral issues,

they

received.

Thus,

including the

as shown by the number of
the

interaction

between

wrongness and nature of act proved to be unexpectedly highly significant
also [£(1,88)=18.77, £<.0001].

Subsequent !tests revealed that the per-.

centages of moral justifications given were arrayed in much the same way
that the seriousness ratings were arrayed.

The nonsexual "wrong" acts

received the highest percentage of moral justifications and the sexual
"wrong" acts received the second highest percentage.

However, the non-

sexual "nonwrong" and sexual "nonwrong" acts received the same percentage of moral justifications, significantly below the other two percentages.

Like

the

above

results,

these

results

clearly

show

that

all

sexual acts are not considered by university students to be nonmoral
(conventional) issues, but that sexual acts,

like nonsexual acts, fall
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into two distinct groups,

here a moral

group and a nonmoral group.

Nonwrong ratings were, of course, not included in this analysis, since
acts rated 4 (not wrong at all) were not given justifications why they
were wrong.
Male vs. female subjects.

Again the hypothesized effect of sex of

subject was not supported by the data [EC1,88)=1.26, n.s.], showing that
men and women did not give significantly different numbers of moral
justifications.

That is, the male subjects were not significantly more

likely than the were the female subjects to see the sexual acts as being
matters of morality.

There was no interaction between wrongness and sex

[EC1,88)<1.00, n.s.], although this interaction had been predicted.
Interactions.

Unexpectedly,

there

was

no

interaction

nature of act and sex of subject [E(l,88)=1.55, n.s.].

between

There was also

no nature by wrongness by sex interaction [E(1,88)<1.00, n.s.].
Relation of Unalterability, Sex and Justifications
A one-way R-ANOVA was done with sex of subject the between-subject
variable and unalterable and alterable acts the two-level within-subject
variable.

The dependent variable was the percentage of moral justific-

ations for why the acts considered to be unalterable and the acts considered to be alterable were wrong.
Unalterable vs.

(See Table 6)

alterable acts.

Supporting the hypothesis, the

data showed that the acts rated as unalterable received a significantly
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TABLE 6
Mean Percent of Moral Justifications by Unalterability and Sex
Male

Female

Unalterable

67.0

66.7

66.9

Alterable

43.1

26.1

34.4

Marginal

55.1

46.4

50.7

Marginal

higher percentage of moral justifications than did the acts rated as
alterable [£:(1,92)=51.62, £<.0001).

This shows that the acts seen as

unalterable are the same ones that are seen by these subjects to be matters of morality, not of convention.
Male vs. female subjects.

In this analysis only, there was a mar-

ginal effect of sex [£(1,92)=2.96, E<.l).

However, here no difference

between men and women had been expected!

This demonstrates that there

was a marginally-significant difference between the percentages of moral
reasons given by men and by women.
significant

interaction

[£:(1,92)=3.46, £<.1).

between

The data also showed a marginally
sex

of

subject

and

unalterability
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Relation of Universality, Sex, and Justifications
A oneway

R-ANOVA

was

performed

using

sex

of

subject

as

the

between-subject variable and universality as the within-subject variable.

Again, the dependent variable was the percentage of moral justif-

ications given for each universality rating.
Universality vs. cultural relativity.

(See Table 7)
As expected, the acts rated

as universally wrong received a significantly higher percentage of moral
justifications than did the acts not rated universally-wrong (culturally-relative acts) [I(1,92)=67.34, £<.0001].
TABLE 7
Mean Percent of Moral Justifications by Universality and Sex
Male

Female

Universal

69.1

69.2

69.1

Relative

38.9

26.1

32.4

Marginal

54.0

47.6

50.8

Male vs. female subjects.
ence, as

expect~d

Total

There was no significant sex differ-

[IC1,92)=1.80, n.s.]. Men and women gave an equal per-

centage of moral justifications to the acts they considered to be universal and to the acts they considered to be culturally-relative. There
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was

no

interaction

between

sex

of

subject

and

universality

[E(1,92)=2.11, n.s.], also as expected.
Miscellaneous Analyses
An ANOVA was performed with Versions A and B of the justification
page as the independent variable and the percent of moral justifications
as the dependent variable. There was no effect of order of justifications [E(1,93)<1.00, n.s.].
Also, a hand tally was made of the justifications for why some of
the acts were considered to be wrong,
sexual "wrong" acts.

specifically the controversial

Forty-seven of the 98 subjects said that "open

marriage" is wrong because it "breaks a promise or vow"; the next most
popular reason (also a moral one:
for all time would be broken) was

that God's law for all human beings
chosen by only 16 subjects.

Only

three said that "open marriage" was "unfair".
Twenty-eight students wrote that

female homosexuality was wrong

because "it violates the natural order, which requires preserving life";
this was likewise the reason chosen by 26 subjects for why male homosexuality was wrong.

For both male and female homosexuality, this negative

consequence to the preservation of life was the most common reason given
for why the act was wrong.

None of the students said that homnosexual-

ity was wrong because it was unfair.
For the nonmarital intercourse question, three justifications vied
for the most popular place.

Twelve students said the act was wrong
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because it violates God's universal law, a moral reason, but 13 students
said it was wrong because it violates God's law for Catholics and thirteen because it violates Canon Law, which also pertains only to Catholics.

The latter two reasons are conventional ones; thus, the nonmari-

tal sex item was primarily responsible for the fact that this sexual
"wrong" group was as far below the nonsexual "wrong" group in percentage
of moral over nonmoral justifications as it was.

Only one student said

that nonmarital intercourse was "unfair".
A hand tally was performed of the justifications assigned to the
nonsexual "nonwrong" acts, in an attempt to clarify why these acts were
considered to be more seriously wrong by the men than by the women.

The

vast majority of the subjects of both sexes considered missing Mass and
Communion on both Sundays and holidays to be wrong because it violates
either Canon Law or "God's law for Catholics";

a chi square analysis

revealed that there was no significant different between the sexes here.
There were quite a few sex differences
divorce was considered to be wrong,
favorite among the justifications.

in the reasons given for why

an area where there was no clear
However, none of these differences

was significant either.
The men and the women gave the same number of moral and conventional justifications for divorce, but three women and no men gave a
prudential reason:
logically."

"Anyone who did this would hurt him/herself psycho-

Among the moral reasons, five men gave "is against the law

laid down by God for all human beings for all time," while only one
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woman gave this reason.

This was

by far the largest sex difference

between the number of subjects who used any of the justifications.
Although the predicted tendency for

women to use conventional

justifications more than men was not borne out by the data, a hand tally
of use of the reason "The act is disgusting" for why acts were wrong was
performed to see if women might nonetheless have been socialized to
judge the morality of sexual acts more emotionally than were men.
"disgusting" justification was,
acts.

The

indeed, used only pertaining to sexual

Forty women and 21 men used the justification; a chi square anal-

ysis revealed that the difference was significant [£<.001).
Correlations
This section will briefly review the results of the correlations
performed on the data, one between the test of seriousness on pages 2
and 3 and the test of unalterability on page 5, one between the test of
seriousness and the test of universality (p.

6),

and one between the

unalterability and universality tests.
Seriousness and Unalterability
Spearman's rho was used to correlate the seriousness test with the
alterability test, since neither of the tests contained interval data.
It will be remembered that when seriousness was used as the dependent
variable in an ANOVA it was treated as an interval variable for lack of
a better way to perform the analysis.

Actually, the scale was not an

interval scale but an ordinal scale, since the distance between such
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ranks as "seriously wrong" and "not wrong at all" cannot be quantified.
Therefore Spearman's rho was thought to be the best measure to use to
correlate seriousness with unalterability.
made to ascertain whether,
the same variable.

(See Table 8) An attempt was

for these subjects, the two tests measured

For each subject, the seriousness rating given to

Act 1 was correlated with the alterability rating given to Act 1, Act
2's seriousness was correlated Act 2's alterability, and so on.

Four-

teen of the 16 correlations ranged from 0.3 to 0.8; the overall correlation was 0.49.

Thus the two tests were moderately correlated.

However,

all the correlations (Table 8) except for the issues of rape (Act 5) and
stealing (Act 7) were significant.
Seriousness and Universality
Spearman's rho was also used to correlate the ranked data of the
seriousness test with the universality test responses.
relations were done act by act.

Again, the cor-

Thirteen of the 16 acts received corre-

lations ranging from 0.3 to 0.7; the overall correlation was 0.41.
these two tests were also correlated.

All the correlations except those

for stealing (Act 7) and murder (Act 14) were significant.
9)

Thus

(See Table
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TABLE 8
Correlations Between Seriousness and Unalterability
Act Number

Act Number

-k

1

0.57

"i':"i':-;";

9

0.72

-;'~*"i':

2

0.58

-;':;':;~

10

0.59

;':-;~;~

3

0. 77

";':'i':-;':

11

0.48

-;':-;':;':

4

0.42

;~;':;':

12

0.70

";':;':;':

5

-0.02

13

0.33

";':;':;':

6

0.67

14

0.58

'i':··k-;':

7

0.04

15

0.57

'i':;':;':

8

0.26

16

0.59

";'(;~;':

£<.05

;':t':;':

,,,..,,,
"i':'i':

£<.01

·'i':'i':-;'\

£<.001
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TABLE 9
Correlations Between Seriousness and Universality
Act Number

..k

Act Number

1

0.33

·k;';;.'~

9

0.62

··k-kt':

2

0.53

;':·#'\;':

10

0.56

;':;':-;':

3

0.64

;':;';;':

11

0.30

-;';;':

4

0.37

-;':t':;':

12

0.51

"t'r-;':i':

5

0.19

··k

13

0.27

;':;':

6

0.63

;':··l:'i':

14

-0.04

7

0.10

15

0.61

;':;': ..k

8

0.29

16

0.56

;':;':;':

£<.05

;':;':
;':··;':

£<.01

;':-/:;':

£<.001
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Unalterability and Universality
Last, Spearman's rho was used to correlate the unalterability test
with the universality test, again, act by act.
relations ranged

from 0.3 to 0.8;

Thirteen of the 16 cor-

the overall

correlation was

0.49.

This shows that these two tests were about as highly correlated as the
seriousness and universality tests.

Except for

the correlations

for

rape (Act 5), male homosexuality (Act 10) and murder (Act 14), all the
correlations were significant.

(See Table 10)

In conclusion, the results detailed showed that all the effects
hypothesized were supported by the data except the sex difference.

An

unexpected effect of sexual vs. nonsexual nature of act was found, such
that the sexual acts were significantly less likely to be rated as seriously wrong or to be considered as moral issues than the nonsexual acts.
And the seriousness, alterability and universality scales were significantly correlated with each other.

62
TABLE 10
Correlations Between Unalterability and Universality
Act Number

*

Act Number
-;':-;~";':

1

0.39

-;':~':~':

9

0.75

2

0.64

;':";':"i':

10

0.14

3

0.81

-;':"';':-;':

11

0.29

-;':";':

4

0.34

·k·k-;':

12

0.61

··k-;':;':

5

-0.02

13

0.62

;':;':1':

6

0.78

-;':-;':-;':

14

-0.02

7

0.26

t':-;':

15

0.64

"';':;':;':

8

0.42

-;':";':-;':

16

0.81

t':'i':;':

£<.05

-;':-;':

£<.01

"i':'i':-;':

£<.001

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION
This chapter will discuss the results detailed in Chapter III and
their implications for the debate between Turiel and Kohlberg.

Last,

further research in this field will be suggested.
Differences Between Acts
The results of this study show support for the prediction that
Catholic

university students

make

a

consistent set

of

distinctions

between acts that are moral issues and acts that are not moral issues.
Using Turiel's four criteria (cited in Chapter I) for determining what
is moral and what is not moral, the subjects placed the eight acts predicted to be moral

("wrong" acts) in the moral domain and placed the

eight acts hypothesized not to be moral issues ("nonwrong" acts) in the
nonmoral area. The same eight acts predicted to be "wrong" were rated as
universally applicable, and the eight acts hypothesized to be "nonwrong"
were seen as culturally relative (Criterion #3).

The eight "wrong" acts

were also rated as unalterable while the eight "nonwrong" acts were seen
to be alterable (Criterion #2).

Thus, Criteria #2 and #3 are used con-

sistently to distinguish what is moral from what is not moral.
The students also used the Intrinsicality (#1) criterion; this was
done when they chose justifications for why they considered the acts to
be wrong.

Use of this criterion placed the four nonsexual "wrong" acts
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(murder,

rape,

stealing and breaking the

domain and the four sexual "wrong" acts

promise) high

in the

moral

(nonmarital intercourse,

male

and female homosexuality and open marriages) lower in the moral domain.
The analysis using seriousness ratings
variable instead of

(Criterion #4) as the dependent

justifications showed the same hierarchy and the

same amount of difference between the two groups of

"wrong " acts.

It

may be concluded that, for these acts, Criteria #1 and #4 are used consistently to distinguish the moral from the nonmoral, and that the acts
are grouped the same as

for the universality and unalterability cri-

teria.
Use

of

the

Intrinsicality criterion

placed the

four

nonsexual

"nonwrong" acts (birth control and missing Mass and Communion) and the
four sexual "nonwrong" acts

(kissing,

masturbation,

premarital inter-

course and divorce) at equal levels in the moral domain; that is, they
received almost equal percentages of moral justifications (29% and 28%
respectively).

But

use of

the

Seriousness

criterion placed the

two

types of acts in two very distinct groups, since the mean seriousness
rating for the nonsexual "nonwrong" acts was 5. 7 and the mean for the
sexual "nonwrong" acts was 2.2.
Does this mean that
were

treated

differently

for the "nonwrong" acts Criteria #1 and #4
by the

subjects?

Examination of

revealed that the answer to this question is no.
acts

received far more 4

(not wrong at all)

the

data

The sexual "nonwrong"

ratings than any of the

other three groups. But the 4 ratings were not used at all in the analysis where nature, wrongness and justifications were compared (the first
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analysis mentioned above) so that there was little observed difference
between the two groups of "nonwrong" acts.

However, the analysis com-

paring nature, wrongness and seriousness did use the 4 ratings.

Since

so many of the 4s were sexual "nonwrong" acts, this caused the sexual
and nonsexual "wrong" groups to become much more clearly separated from
each other.
The implications of these findings are, first, that, according to
the first analysis, neither the sexual nor the nonsexual "nonwrong" acts
were considered to be moral issues.
well as

the "wrong" acts,

the

Thus,

for the "nonwrong" acts as

Intrinsicality criterion distinguished

between moral and nonmoral consistently with respect to the other criteria.

Second, the seriousness ratings showed that the nonsexual "non-

wrong" acts were considered to be matters of convention, not morality,

since most subjects gave these acts "fairly wrong" ratings.

The sexual

"nonwrong" acts were seen as prudential matters rather than as moral
matters,

since they were usually rated as "not wrong at all."

These

results are not surprising because the nonsexual "nonwrong" acts are all
covered by rules that are considered to be important for the stability
of the Catholic Church.

These rules may have been given considerably

higher seriousness ratings than the sexual rules because Catholic adults
understand their importance to the Catholic Church (their value as conventions), while they do not conceive of the sexual rules as having any
power to hold the Catholic Church together. That is, they see the sexual
rules as only prudential issues; they are not seen as being wrong at all
or, if wrong, wrong only because they are mistakes or matters of mis-
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judgment.

Yet the nonsexual acts were given equal (but low) percentages

of moral justifications as the sexual acts because it is understood that
the acts are just as alterable as the sexual acts and are also applicable only to Catholics.
Therefore, it is clear that all the four criteria used by Turiel
consistently allocate the eight "wrong" acts to the moral domain and the
eight "nonwrong" acts to one or another of the two nonmoral domains.
Also,

while

the

II

nonwrong II

acts

are

all

considered

to be

issues, the sexual "nonwrong" acts are alone considered,
part, not to be wrong at all.

nonmoral

for the most

The strong effect of sexual vs. nonsexual

nature of the acts found by the data analysis is consistent with these
results.

The sexual "wrong" acts were rated as more seriously wrong

than any of the "nonwrong" acts, but they were not rated as seriously
wrong as the nonsexual "wrong" acts.

Likewise, they were given moral

justifications by more subjects than were the "nonwrong" acts, but by
fewer subjects than were the nonsexual "wrong" acts. Thus, while the
sexual acts fell into two distinct groups, one moral and one conventional, they were nonetheless consistently ranked as less serious than
the moral acts with the same wrongness rating.
appears to result from university students'
sexual right and wrong.

This interesting effect
liberal attitudes

toward

While the subjects were Catholics, their uni-

versity environment affected their sexual attitudes more than did the
Catholic authorities.

The rules specific to the Catholic Church, how-

ever, such as missing Mass, were probably not affected negatively by the
university environment, and the rules forbidding such acts as murder and
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rape
Hence,

may
the

well

have

nonsexual

actually been
acts

were

strengthened

considered

to

by
be

the

environment.

much more

serious

issues, on the average, than the sexual acts.
A few more remarks may be added to the discussion of the subjects'
treatment of the "wrong" acts as opposed to the "nonwrong" acts.

Exami-

nation of Table 3 reveals that the addition of the nonmarital

inter-

course question did help to clarify students' sexual attitudes.

Inter-

course without intention to marry was seen as far more seriously wrong
than premarital

intercourse,

possibly because of

they are married," which makes it
marriage.

the wording

"before

look as if the couple are planning

Apparently university students take the marriage commitment

very seriously;

most of the students rated open marriages wrong also,

giving the fact that it "breaks a promise or vow" as the reason.

The

students' assignments of justifications, therefore, clearly grouped the
nonmarital intercourse, open marriage and homosexuality items in a seriously morally wrong block and the kissing, premarital intercourse, masturbation and birth control items in a not-wrong-at-all block, as can be
seen by Figur~ 2.
It will be remembered that the two issues of homosexuality and
"open marriage"

were answered in a

confusing way by the

subjects of

Nucci and Junker (1982) and that this study included these items in an
attempt to clarify them.

This study also included a female homosexual-

ity item for comparison with Nucci's male homosexuality item.

The sub-

jects, as expected, gave the male and female homosexuality items almost
exactly the same seriousness rating, and they used exactly the same rea-
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sons

for why

the two

items were wrong.

Thus,

for

these students,

homosexuality between males and between females is the same issue, morally.

The nonmarital intercourse question that was added to the ques-

tionnaire completed the sexual "wrong" group.

Almost as many subjects

rated these four acts as universal and unalterable as rated the nonsexual "wrong" acts as universal and unalterable.
the number of universal

and unalterable

(See Tables 6 and 7) And

ratings given the nonsexual

"nonwrong" acts was not much smaller.
But although observation of these unalterability and universality
ratings alone would indicate that these four sexual acts are in a grey
area between morality and convention, observations of the seriousness
ratings (see Table 3) and the percentages of moral justifications (see
Figure 3) clearly show that these acts are seen as distinctly more serious issues than are any "non wrong ,, acts,

and are seen as moral issues

also.
Turiel used two criteria to determine whether or not acts
intrinsically wrong:
its very nature.

are

the act could be unjust, or it could cause harm by

He did not predict that homosexuality and "open mar-

riage," or any sexual acts, would be moral issues because he saw no
intrinsic injustice in sexual acts.
students.
harmful.

Neither do most Catholic university

However students do see certain sexual acts as intrinsically
Most of the students believed that "open marriage" was wrong

because it "breaks a promise or vow," a consequence that causes hurt to
others.

The most frequently used justification for why homosexuality

was wrong was that it threatened the preservation of human life, also a
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harmful consequence to others.

These results do not leave too much room

for doubt that there are at least three sexual behaviors that are seen
as seriously wrong for moral reasons, even by sexually liberal university students.
Examination of Appendix A reveals that rape,

as predicted, was

grouped by the subjects among the nonsexual "wrong" acts rather than
among the sexual "wrong" acts.

The fact that it was considered to be as

seriously wrong as the other violent acts shows that it was,

indeed,

considered by the students to be more a violent act than a sexual one.
These results, as it had been hoped,

further confirmed Turiel's

theory that most individuals perceive clearly the distinction between
morality and convention that he postulates exists for nonsexual issues.
They also bolstered Turiel 's theory by showing that the eight sexual
issues tested do not fall in a "grey" area between morality and convention but aline themselves clearly in one or the other domain, at least
for Catholic university students.
and

convention

are

not

Thus, Kohlberg's theory that morality

clearly distinguished

until

and

unless

one

reaches the principled level of moral development is further weakened.
Differences Between Subjects
There were no differences in how the men and the women rated all
the sixteen acts as a group, but within one of the groups of acts an
unexpected sex difference was found in the seriousness ratings.

The men

gave more serious ratings to the nonsexual "nonwrong" acts (divorce and
missing Mass and Communion) than did the women. In light of the fact
that fewer men than women are seen at Mass, this is a difficult result
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to interpret.

The conclusions of Gilligan (1982) and Haan (1975) that

men are more apt than are women to reason hypothetically in moral situations may explain these results.

Gilligan compared the responses of

girls and of boys on Kohl berg's Moral Judgment Inventory.

She found

that the girls focused on relationship factors when solving moral dilemmas while boys focused, as Kohlberg expects, on logical deduction from
hypothetical rights and duties.

When presented with one of the dilemmas

in the MJI, the "Heinz" dilemma, the boys usually said that Heinz has a
moral duty to steal a drug needed to save his wife's life because the
druggist refused to give him the drug and his wife has a right to life.
However, many of the girls refused to see the issue as a logic problem
for Heinz, as it was intended,

and instead saw it as a communication

problem between Heinz and the druggist.

Thus, they suggested improving

the communication between them, an interpersonal solution.
maintained that

The girls

it was wrong for Heinz to steal the drug but that

Heinz's wife could still be saved by other means.

Gilligan writes that

"Women's construction of the moral problem as a problem of care and
responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and rules
ties the development of their moral thinking to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of
morality as justice [i.e., rights] ties [men's] development to the logic
of equality and reciprocity" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 73).
Haan' s

(1975) research on university students also shows a sex

difference in moral reasoning.

She maintains that adult women are more

concerned with real as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas,

just as were
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Gilligan's female subjects.

To apply these ideas to the present study,

Catholic men, while answering what they see as a a theoretical question,
would say that the rule to attend Mass and Communion is a serious one,
but while deciding whether or not to actually obey i t would look for
loopholes.

On the other hand, Catholic women would consider the rule

from a more practical, interpersonal viewpoint.

It could well be that a

healthy person would miss Mass and Communion because his or her child is
ill, because a friend needs help, or for any number of relationship-centered reasons.

And, as Gilligan states, love and interpersonal respon-

sibility are the major determinants of moral right and wrong for women.
True, the questionnaire asked only for evaluation of the hypothetical
rightness and wrongness of the acts, but the women may have nonetheless
remembered real situations in their own past and therefore marked these
rules as less seriously wrong than did men because of the extenuating
interpersonal circumstances they remembered.

The acts in the categories

other than the nonsexual "wrong" group may not have been affected by the
hypothetical/practical sex difference, since they already involve interpersonal situations, as the Canon Laws do not.
Divorce was also one of the acts marked less seriously wrong by
the women than by the men.

The noticeable, though insignificant, sex

differences between the justifications given why divorce was wrong may
explain this effect.

Only women mentioned that by divorcing one might

bring harm upon oneself, a very practical reason.
gave

"God's law"

for

all human beings

as

the

Also, only one women
justification for why

divorce was wrong, while five men gave this very theoretical reason.
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Thus

the men may,

again,

have been thinking more hypothetically than

were the women.
Last,

the fact

that significantly more women than men used the

justification "The act is disgusting" (only used for sexual acts) gives
some support to the hypothesis that women may be socialized differently
than

are

men concerning

sexual

morality.

The prediction that

women

would see the sexual acts as more seriously wrong than would men because
of differential socialization was not upheld, but these women do seem to
view the morality of sexual acts from a more emotional viewpoint than do
the men.

This difference could, indeed have resulted from the predicted

differential
socializers
desired.
men,

socialization
may

have

concerning

obtained

a

sexual

different

Instead of instilling a strict, at

attitude

toward

sexuality

in

the

issues.

result

The

from

the

women's
one

they

least as compared to the

women,

they

may have

merely

instilled an attitude of disgust toward sexual matters.
In conclusion,

although the

predicted sex differences were

upheld by the data, two unexpected sex differences were found.

not

Catholic

university men answer questions about the seriousness of specific Church
laws more strictly than do Catholic women, perhaps because they think
about this type of issue more hypothetically than do women.

Also, the

men in this study were less likely to state that the sexual acts were
wrong

because

they were

"disgusting"

than were

because of differential sexual socialization.

the

women,

possibly
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Correlations
Spearman rank order correlations between the Seriousness, Unalterability and Universality tests were performed in this study, as in the
Nucci and Junker study.

The three tests were found to be significantly

related, but most of this study's correlations ranged from 0.3 to 0.8,
while Nucci and Junker's correlations were all in the 0. 9 area.

This

difference probably resulted from one or both of two factors.

This

study's questionnaire was considerably shorter than that used by Nucci
and Junker, who also stopped the subjects more often than did this
researcher.

Possibly their subjects became fatigued near the end of the

study and took the easy way out by answering the last two tests,
unalterability and universality tests,

the

in the same way. This study's

subjects may have continued to make distinctions between the tests until
the experiment ended, since it only lasted 20 minutes.
Second, examination of Tables 8 to 10 will reveal that the nonsexual "wrong" acts (Acts 5, 7, 8 and 14) showed the lowest and least significant correlations.

But the raw data reveals that,

for these four

acts, almost all the subjects marked 1 (very seriously wrong), 1 (unalterable) and 1 (universal), while there was much more variance for the
other 12 acts.

Murder, rape, stealing and breaking the serious promise

appear to show low correlations between the various scales only because
the correlation statistic is based on variance, and,

in this

study,

these four acts showed almost no variance. Thus, although the tests in
this study were only moderately intercorrelated, there would nonetheless
appear to be a great deal of overlap in what the tests measure.
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In conclusion, as predicted, the behaviors considered by the students tested by this research to be seriously wrong were seen as wrong
because they were considered to be moral issues, not violations of convention, even if the acts were sexual acts.

Also, the acts considered

to be fairly wrong or not wrong at all were seen as wrong either because
they were considered to be conventional or prudential (not wrong at all)
issues.
Also as hypothesized, Catholic university students were found to
group sexual

acts

considered to be seriously wrong by the Catholic

Church in two distinct

groups:

acts that really are seriously morally

wrong, such as homosexuality and "open marriage," and acts that are not
wrong or only fairly wrong because they are violations of Catholic convention only, such as kissing and premarital intercourse.
The prediction that the same eight acts rated as most seriously
wrong would also be the most often rated as unalterable and universal
was also upheld by the data.

Likewise, the eight acts rated as least

seriously wrong were least often rated as unalterable and universal.
Last, the hypothesis that men's and women's ratings of the sexual
acts overall would differ was not supported by the data.

However, the

men did rate four of the nonsexual acts, the rules that are the most
specific to the Catholic Church,
women.

as more seriously wrong than did the

This was probably because women think of moral dilemmas in more

practical terms than do men, and these dilemmas involved more leeway for
hypothetical/practical differences than do the other issues.
Thus, this study appears to have made a useful contribution to the
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area of moral development by helping to answer the question as to which
issues Catholic adults consider to be moral ones and which they consider
to be conventional

and therefore applicable only

to Catholics,

espe-

cially in the sexual area.

Implications for Further Research
The area of discrimination between morality and convention is
very small one at the present time, but only because it is so new.

a
It

is certainly a very important one and needs to be expanded.

This study

has

use

shown

(intrinsic)
tional or

once

again

that

justifications
prudential

Catholic

for very

justifications

university

students

seriously wrong
for

fairly

acts

and

moral

conven-

seriously wrong

acts.

This contradicts Kohlberg's assumption that morality and convention are
not clearly distinguished,
young adulthood.

if at all,

Since this

until

late adolescence or even

assumption is the basis of the MJI,

and

since the MJI is the major measure of moral development to date, a new
test of moral development needs to be created that tests only the moral
domain.

Turiel's test could be used to measure development in the con-

ventional domain.
Also,

replicative studies need to be done to confirm the unex-

pected sex difference found by this study.

If it is confirmed, the new

test

take

of

moral

development

would

have

to

this

difference

into

account in order to reduce the risk of sex bias.
Once

it

has been

established

that

morality and

indeed distinct areas, and tests of development

convention

are

in the two areas have

been shown to be reliable and valid, it will be necessary to create val-
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ues education programs for the schools for each of the two areas.

Val-

ues education programs can be found in the curricula of some schools
already, but many of these programs are based on theories that confuse
morality with convention

(Durkheim,

1925/ 1961) and see all right and

wrong as purely a matter of social consensus within particular cultures.
That is, they do not see any rules as universally applicable or unalterable; they believe that all rules hold within certain societies only.
This is because they do not see any act as wrong in itself, that is,
intrinsically wrong. Morality, therefore, is the same as convention for
them, and Turiel's four criteria are considered to be meaningless.
But this and the many other studies cited in Chapter I have shown
that children do see a difference between morality and convention and do
use the Intrinsicality criterion to determine what the difference is.
That is, many individuals see some acts as intrinsically wrong, and they
also see these acts, for the most part, as the only morally wrong acts.
Thus values education which does not acknowledge the existence of the
two domains is doomed to failure.

The young students, unable to inte-

grate what they are being "taught" in values education class with their
intuitions about right and wrong, will not learn from such a class.
For instance, whenever a child hits another child, the intrinsic
harm and injustice needs to be pointed out; this response should not
vary from child' to child and should not be subject to change.

But when

a child calls a teacher by her first name, no harm should be mentioned.
Instead,

the value of the convention of addressing teachers by their

titles for the coherence of the school environment would be discussed.
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Perhaps a vote might even be taken, allowing the students themselves to
decide

if

this

conventional

rule

should

be

changed

or

not.

This

acknowledgement of the distinctions between moral and conventional rules
would certainly increase the students' respect for both the rules and
the authorities, and might increase their obedience considerably also.
Thus, this study has answered some questions but has also presented new questions.

And it has given moral development researchers

and educators more tasks that clearly need to be done.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY
One of the most intriguing issues in the area of moral development
has been the question of whether most adults see a distinction between
the areas of morality and convention, that is, acts that are intrinsically wrong and acts

that are wrong only because of societal

rules

against them. This study has shown that Catholic university students do
see this distinction.

In fact, most students are in agreement about

what is and is not morally right and wrong.

This finding is consistent

with most of the research conducted by Turiel, Nucci and others, which
has also demonstrated the existence of this perceived distinction.
This study,

like the previous studies,

confirmed that Catholic

adults use Turiel's criteria of seriousness, unalterability and universality to distinguish between moral and nonmoral issues.

It also, for

the first time, tested Turiel's intrinsicality criterion specifically by
asking students to choose reasons why the acts seen as wrong were wrong.
The Intrinsicality test showed results consistent with the results of
the other three tests; Catholics do give moral justifications for very
wrong acts and nonmoral justifications for acts are only fairly wrong.
It was also shown here that, although Catholic university students
see sexual

issues in general as

less seriously wrong than nonsexual

issues, they do see some sexual issues as serious moral issues.
78

That

79

is, they see some of the sexual acts that are forbidden by the Catholic
Church as

not wrong at

all but some of the acts as

seriously wrong

because they harm other persons or the world in general.

They view non-

sexual issues as belonging in two distinct groups also:

acts seriously

wrong because of intrinsic harm or injustice and acts fairly wrong only
because they are covered by rules that are important to hold the Catholic Church together.
It was revealed that the Catholic university men saw breaking the
rules specific to the Catholic Church, such as missing Mass on Sunday,
as more seriously wrong than did the women.

This sex difference,

if

replicated, should be taken into account by persons testing the moral
development of Catholics both sexes.
Last, the seriousness, unalterability and universality scales used
here were sufficiently highly intercorrelated to show that these three
criteria measure basically the same thing: whether acts are moral, conventional or prudential (nonwrong) issues.
These findings are not only important for psychologists seeking to
understand moral reasoning processes.

They are also important for edu-

cators, since value education can be improved greatly by basing both
values testing and curricula on the greater knowledge of moral reasoning
contributed by this research.
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PERCENTAGE OF RESPONSES GIVEN USING EACH SERIOUSNESS RATING

Very Seriously
Wrong (1)
~1

Seriously
Wrong (2)

F

M

F

Fairly Seriously Not Wrong
Wrong (3)
M

At All (4)

F

M

F

0.0

2.0

0.0

Nonsexual "Wrong" Acts
5. Rape

Total
7. Stealing

Total
8. Br. Promise

Total
14. Murder

Total

95.9 98.0
97.1
63.3 71.4

2.0

2.0

2.0

0.0

32.7 28.6
29.4

40.8 61.2

40.8 30.6

98.0 95.9
97.1

35.3
2.0

4.1

1.0
0.0

2.9

67.6

52.0

0.0

16.3

2.0

0.0

0.0

0.0
8.2

11.8
2.0

0.0

2.0

0.0

1.0
2.0

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Sexual "Wrong" Acts
9. Nonmar. Int. 14.3 22.4

Total
10. Male Homo.

Total
13. Open Mar.

Total
16. Fern. Homo.

Total

18.4 16.3

32.7 34.7

34.7 26.5

17.6

18.6

32.4

31.4

67.3 34.7

16.3 26.5

10.2 26.5

6.1 12.2

50.0

20.6

19.6

9.8

40.8 71.4
55.9
61.2 40.8
50.0

40.8 18.4
29.4
20.4 22.4
20.6

12.2

6.1

9.8
12.2 24.5
19.6

6.1

4.1

4.9
6.1 12.2
9.8
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Very Seriously
Wrong (1)
M

F

Seriously
Wrong (2)
M

F

Fairly Seriously
Wrong (3)
M

F

Not Wrong
At All (4)
M

F

Nonsexual "Nonwrong II Acts
1.

~!iss

Mass

Total
4. Miss Comm.
Total

10.2

8.2

12. Divorce
Total

38.8 55.1

22.4 24.5

8.8

21.6

45.1

24.5

22.4 14.3

34.7 20.4

26.5 40.8

16.3 24.5

17.6

28.4

33.3

20.6

30.6 20.4

30.6 34.7

10.2 16.3

31.4

13.7

18.4 36.7

24.5 26.5

11. Xmas, Eas. 28.6 28.6
Total

28.6 12.2

28.4

26.5

22.4 14.3

34.7 22.4

17.6

29.4

27.5

25.5

Sexual "Nonwrong" Acts
2. Kissing

0.0

0.0

2.0

4.1

12.2 10.2

85.7 85.7

Total

0.0

2.9

10.8

86.3

3. Mastur.

6.1 10.2

18.4 14.3

30.6 22.4

44.9 53.1

28.4

48.0

24.5 20.4

65.3 67.3

Total
6. Birth Cont.
Total
15. Prem. Int.
Total

15.7

7.8
4.1

4.1

3.9
4.1
5.9

6.1

8.2

6.9
8.2

10.2 18.4
13.7

22.5
26.5 18.4
23.5

66.7
59.2 55.1
56.9

APPENDIX B

86
PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS SAYING THAT ACTS ARE UNALTERABLE, UNIVERSAL

Act Rating

Unalterable

Universal

Nonsexual "Wrong" Acts
5. Rape

99.0

95.1

7. Stealing

97.1

96.1

8. Breaking

96.1

89.2

99.0

97.1

a Promise
14. Murder

Sexual "Wrong" Acts
9. Nonmarital

53.9

47.1

79.4

73.5

87.3

83.3

79.4

74.5

Intercourse
10. Male
Homosexuality
13. Open
Marriages
16. Female
Homosexuality
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Act Rating

Unalterable

Universal

Nonsexual "Nonwrong" Acts
1. Missing

58.8

46.1

64.7

48.0

70.6

55.9

47.1

47.1

Mass
4. Missing
Communion
11. Missing
Easter Duty
12. Divorce

Sexual "Nonwrong" Acts
2. Kissing

6.9

7.8

3. Mastur-

38.2

37.3

15.7

20.6

18.6

25.5

bation
6. Birth
Control
15. Premarital
Intercourse

APPENDIX C
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QUESTIONNAIRE

Your age:

Your sex:

M

F

Please give us some informatien regarding your Catholic background, Please answer each question by placing a checkmark in the
space for the statement that most clearly r.escribes your experience.
1.

Did you attend a Catholic school while you were growing up?

YES

NO - - - - - -

If yes, what grades?
K_ 1_'_ 2_ 3_ 4_

5_

6_ 7_._. 8_ 9_ 10_ 11_·12_

2. Did you attend Catechism class (rather than full-time Catholic
school) while you were young?
NO_ _ _ _ _ __

YES _ _ _ _ __

If yes, how many years did you attend?
1 year__ 2 years__ 3 years__ 4 years__ 5 or more years__

3.

About how often do you attend Mass?

more than
once a week

4.

once a
week

2-3 times
a month

once a
month

2-3 times
a year

once a
year

almost
never

2-3 times
a year

once a
year

almoxt
never

About how often do you receive Communion?

more than
once a week

once a
week

2-3 times
a month

once a
month

5. IX> you believe that Hary, the mother of Jesus Christ, was a virgin
at the time of Christ's birth?
YES

6.

NO - - - - - - -

IX> you believe that Christ rose from the dead after his crucifixion?

YES

NO - - - - - - -

7. Do you believe that the Pope is infallible when he speaks and
writes officially (e.g. in encyclicals) on matters of faith and
morals?
YES _ _ _ _ __

NO _ _ _ _ _ __

2

For each of the following acts, please indicate whether you
believe that the act is very seriously wrong, seriously wrong, fairly
wrong, or not wrong 11t all. Circle ~ nUJ!Iber for each act.
Very Seriously
wrong

Not Wronf'

Seriously
wrong

&.ill

1. A healthy person does
not attned Mass on
Sunday.

2

.3

4_

2. A man and woman who
do not intend to marry
kiss passionately •

2

.3

4

2

.3

4_

4. A person goes an entire
year without receiving
Communion.

2

.3

4

5. A man rapes a woman.

2

3

4

6. A married couple use
artificial birth control
methods (e.g. the pill, condom).

2

3

4

financially secure
ste11ls .oney from
another person.

2

.3

4

8. After promising to keep
what he hears private, a man
tells a woman's most personal
secrets to a group of
neighbors.

2

3

4

.3. A teenager eng11ges in
masturbation.

?. A person, who is

9. A man and woman who

do not intend to marry
have sexual intercourse.

2

10. Two men, who love each
other, engage in homosexual acts.

2

4

3

4

Very Seriously
1-lrong
11. A healthy person does not
attend Mass on either
Christmas or Easter.

Not

Seriously
l-lrong

tvrC~ng

At All

2

J

4---

2

J

4--

1), A man and his wife with
each other's knovrlodge and
permission each occasionally
have sexual intercourse
with s~meone else.

2

J

4--

14. A man sho~ts and kills a
stranger on a train
platform.

2

J

4-

2

J

4--

2

J

4

12. A married couple get a
divorce.

15. A man and woman who
love each other have
sexual intercourse
before they are married.
16. Two women,who love
each other, engage in
homosexual acts.

STOP II

JJO uor CONTINUE UNTIL TOLD TO 00 SO I

4

Below is a chart of possible reasons why an act m:i:ght be wrong,
Please return to the list on the previous two pages. For each act that
you marked at all wrong, please roark on th3 line to the f~r right of it
the letter that most closely corresponds to the most imp:rt~nt reason
in the chart that the act is wrong. Use as many or as few of the
reasons in the chart as you wish, but please do not mark more than
one (1) letter for each act. If you did not consider an act to be
wrong, please place an "X" on the line to the far right of it.
Feel free to change any answers you wrote, and to pull the questionnaire apart to lay the pages out side qy side.
A.

To do/not do this would very likely hurt another person.

B. It violates the natural order, which requires preserving life
(including procreation), to de/not do this.
C.

I f Catholics did/didn't do this, the Church would be in trouble.

D.

If everybody did/ didn 1 t do this, the whole world would be in trouble.

E.

It is disgusting to do/not do this.

F. It is dishonest to do/not do this; either it breaks a prc·mise or
vow or should be accompanied by a permanent co~~tment to the partner.
G.

Anyone who did/didn't do this would hurt him/herself physically.

H.

Anyone who did/didn't do this would hurt him/herself psychologically.

I.

It is unfair to do/not do this; it violates others' rights.

J.

Anyone who did/didn't do this would be scorned or laughed at.

K. To do/not do this violates the laws laid down explicitly by the
Catholic Church (Canon Law) for Catholics.
L.

Somebody told me so.

M.

To do/not do this is against the law laid down by God fer Catholics.

N. To do/not do this is against the law laid down qy God fer all
human beings for all time.
0,

In this situation, it is selfish to do/not do this.

5
In recent years the Pope and bishops have rethought Catholic values
and decided that certain rules and laws of the Church should be changed.
Below are listed several acts that are now against Church rules or laws.
For each act, if the Pope and cardinals agreed to drop the rule or law,
would the act be still wrong or all right?
IF THERE IS NO LONGER A CHURCH RULE OR LAW
ABOUT THE ACT BELOW, THE ACT IS •••

1. A healthy person does not attend Mass
on Sunday,

2. A man and woman who do not intend to
marry kiss passionately.
).

A teenager engagQS in masturbation,

4. A person goes an entire year without
receiving Communion.

5. A man rapes a woman.
6. A married couple use artificial birth
control methods (e.g. the pill, condom).

7. A person, who is financially secure,
steals money from another person.
8. After promising to keep what he hears
private, a man tells a woman's most personal secrets to a group of neighbors.
9. A man and woman who do not intend to
marry have sexual intercourse.
10. Two men, who love each other,
engage in homosexual ~ats.
11. A healthy person does not attend
Mass on either Christmas or Easter.
12.

A married couple get a divorce.

1). A man and his •life with each other's
knowledge and permission each occasionally
have sexual intercourse with someone else.

14. A man shoots and kills a stranger
on a train platform,
15. A man and woman who love each other
have sexual intercourse before they are
married.
16. Two women, who love each other,
engage in homosexual acts.

STILL
WRONG

ALL

RIGHT.

6
There are many religions besides Catholicism. Often these religions
have rules and laws which are different from those of the Catholic religion.
Below are li~ted several acts. For each act indicate whether it would be
wrong or all right for another religion to have no rule or law about the act.
IT WOULD BE
FOR ANOTHER RELIGION
TO HAVE NO RULE ABOUT THE ACT BELOW.
1. A hoalthy person does not attend Mass
on Sunday,
2. A man and woman who do not intend to
marry kiss passionately,
).

A teenager engages in masturbation.

4. A person goes an entire year without
receiving Comminion.

5.

A man rapes a woman.

6. A married couple use artificial birth
control methods (e.g. the pill, condom).
7. A person, who is financially secure,
steals money from another person.
8. After promising to keep what he hears
private, a man tells a woman's most personal secrets to a group of neighbors.
9. A man and woman who do not intend to
marry have sexual intercourse.
10. Two men, who love each other,
engage in homosexual acts.
11. A healthy person does not attend Mass
on either Christmas or Easter.
12.

A married couple get a divorce.

1.3. A man and his wife with each other 1 s
knowledge and permission each occasionally
have sexual intercourse with someone else.
14. A man shoots and kills a stranger
on a train platform,
15. A man and woman who love each other
have sexual intercourse before they are
married,
16. Two women, who love each other,
engage in homosexual acts.

WRONG

ALL RIGHT
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